

Civil-Military Integration in Afghanistan

Creating Unity of Command

By JOSHUA W. WELLE



Marines and civilian representatives of U.S. organizations talk with resident in Nawa district of Helmand Province during counterinsurgency operations with Afghan National Security Forces

U.S. Marine Corps (Jeremy Harris)

On the heels of the Afghan presidential elections and General McChrystal's 60-day mission assessment, changes to civilian-military C² should be considered. This article argues why and how ISAF should reorganize its C² structure to ensure true civilian-military integration.

Complex Environment

One of the poorest countries in the world, Afghanistan has a 70 percent illiteracy rate and the world's third highest infant mortality rate. It has been ravaged by 30 years of war and political instability. Creating opportunities for economic growth is difficult because of weak government institutions, dilapidated or nonexistent infrastructure, and significant environmental degradation from drought. Improving Afghanistan's ability to self-govern is of the highest priority, so stabilization efforts are "less about schools and other infrastructure than about the process by which international donors partner with local governments and institutions."³ Ultimate success is achieved through Afghan ownership and execution of enduring development solutions. Thus, there are no quick wins.

President Barack Obama's regional strategy labels the Afghanistan mission as a vital national security interest. The objective is to promote a more capable, accountable, and effective government that serves the Afghan people and can eventually function with limited international support.⁴ Yet in this longer term effort, time is of the essence. By mid-2009, a new Ambassador and military commander were appointed, 17,000 troops were deployed to the southern region, and a clear message from Washington was sent:

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Last year, Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman argued that the way forward in Afghanistan required "a comprehensive civil-military counterinsurgency approach."¹ The U.S. interagency community is answering the call. By mid-2010, there should be over 700 civilians deployed to complement the increase of U.S. troops to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF); however, the "civilian surge" is only a first step toward success in a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. Next, the U.S. Government must integrate personnel into a unified civilian-military structure with clear command and control (C²) systems aligned with the government of Afghanistan and ISAF. Without unity of command throughout civilian and military organizations, there cannot be the unity of effort needed to support Afghanistan in defeating a ruthless insurgency.

The strategy for success, as directed by General Stanley McChrystal, USA, and echoed by Washington pundits, is based on population-centric counterinsurgency doctrine.² COIN literature, from David Galula to David Kilcullen, recognizes good governance and sustainable development as the prize, relegating capture and kill missions to a secondary status. The U.S. Armed Forces are not trained to enhance governance in conflict zones and create long-term development strategies. Accordingly, civilian expertise in a counterinsurgency is a force multiplier. ISAF does not do governance and development; it endeavors to enable others to do it by creating security space in and opportunities for civilian international and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to deliver sustainable progress by, with, and through the Afghan people. The strategy is to shape, clear, hold, and build—through an integrated civilian-military strategy from start to finish.

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ISAF has 12 to 18 months to show evidence of positive momentum to retain support of the coalition.

First-hand Perspective

For 10 months, I served in the Regional Command (RC) South Civilian-Military Planning Cell (Civ-Mil Cell) within ISAF at a turning point in U.S. policy. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, with buy-in from partner nations in the South, advocated this cell to embed civilian expertise needed to guide regional planning efforts away from kinetic operations and toward governance and development-led approaches. The cell, established by Brigadier General John Nicholson, USA, led key initiatives that contributed to Dutch commander General Mark De Kruif's vision of a regional, comprehensive integrated strategy. Our team was on the cutting edge of civilian-military integration.

Paradigm Shift

The war in Afghanistan is witness to a paradigm shift in coalition civilian-military doctrine. An excerpt from the *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook* states:

*In coalition operations, consensus building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key. A successful coalition must establish at least unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a coalition operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.*⁵

Applied to Afghanistan, the last sentence should be rephrased: "The success of a coalition *counterinsurgency* operation begins with the authority to *coordinate* operations of all assigned or attached *civilian and military assets through a common strategy*." If the White House plan for "executing and resourcing an integrated civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy" is to succeed, the C² structure must go beyond the existing plans for civilian-military integration.⁶

Civilian and military operations are converging every day; civilians are the key enablers of a successful COIN strategy. Whole-of-government, comprehensive, and fully integrated policy concepts are bringing foreign and defense ministries more closely together because stability operations require political, economic, and military cooperation. After 8 years, COIN in Afghanistan is unlike

a postconflict stabilization operation. Gone are the days when we could separate security efforts from governance and development activities in a clean phased progression; this is armed nationbuilding. The Taliban rarely distinguish between a United Nations (UN) governance workshop and a Canadian stabilization project. Nor do insurgents separate a World Food Program convoy from a British military patrol. In the eyes of the enemy, those supporting the Afghan government or the coalition are targets. Civilians and military actors therefore must closely cooperate, as all have similar goals, assume comparable risks, and are dependent on one another for success. But cooperation is not enough.

The National Layer

Civilian-military synchronization must start at the national or Kabul level. In the highly centralized model that the government of Afghanistan espouses, political power is focused here and poorly diffused among the provinces. In the effort to keep power and resources controlled by Kabul and to ensure regional warlords are not able to develop major provincial powerbases, critical decisions for each province are made in ministries in the capital. National large-scale road design and construction are not orchestrated by Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); road strategies are part of Afghanistan's master plan and are carried out by the Ministry of

President Obama's regional strategy labels the Afghanistan mission as a vital national security interest

There are distinct layers within Afghan government and ISAF structures that define command and control. The Afghan government has a formal presence at the national, provincial, and district levels. For security, the Ministries of Interior and Defense have a fourth layer: regional headquarters for Afghan National Security Forces. ISAF parallels the government but has more robust RCs with no coequal, nonmilitary Afghan counterpart. Understanding these four tiers is important. As ISAF commits to full "partnership" with the Afghan government and its security forces, it is through these tiers of formal Afghan structures that the coalition can support lasting, positive change.

Public Works partnered with international donors. Concerns about Kajaki Dam power generation or the privatization of the Afghan utility company, for instance, are best directed to Ishmael Khan's Ministry of Energy and Water, not provincial authorities. Power in Afghanistan emanates from the center, and ISAF should approach the Afghan government with a more informed understanding of development strategies.

At the present time, each donor- and troop-contributing nation retains the right to bilaterally engage Afghan ministries on their specific province according to their specific priorities. The Canadian embassy negotiates with the Ministry of Education about its



ISAF (Jeffrey Duran)

Kandahar PRT members talk to local children about delivering donated school supplies

signature projects for Kandahar City. Likewise, the United States engages the Ministry of the Interior regarding Afghan National Police milestones. Each lead nation establishes relationships outside collective synchronization mechanisms, without regard to ISAF. This uncoordinated key leader engagement allows the government to manipulate partner nations and weakens the ability of these nations to band together to combat corruption.

In the face of these competing priorities, there has long been recognition that synchronization is needed. However, in Kabul, Afghan government ministries, embassies, ISAF, and NGOs have consistently failed at effective synchronization because few agree on a single empowered forum for executive level integration. The Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) is the highest level and brings all key stakeholders together in a forum co-led by the Afghan government and UN. But this board is more about process than progress. Issues going to the JCMB are either precooked or watered down to ensure consensus. Major disputes or differences in approach are often necessarily pasted over. Beyond the JCMB, ISAF requires a distinct forum in which the coalition can align assets and efforts prior to government and UN engagement—where problems can be effectively and openly raised and solved and where

its members can be held to a common strategy. Kabul is home to a wealth of successful strategy documents but has no decisionmaking authority to turn words into coordinated action. To date, national level efforts have reflected traditional (read *ineffective*) notions of civilian-military cooperation that resemble herding cats.⁷


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The United States went beyond herding cats in 2009 by creating an Executive Working Group (EWG) that synchronized U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. This forum allowed principals from key organizations—Department of State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), RC East and RC South leadership, and Combined Security Transition Command—to sit in one room once a month and shape U.S. civilian-military plans and operations. From EWG meetings in the spring of 2009, it was apparent this collective body had far-reaching authority in Afghanistan and was formulating a combined civilian-military voice back to Washington.

The EWG, however, was made effective because of a talented support secretariat—the Integrated Civilian Military Action Group (ICMAG)—whose job it was to staff integration up and down the U.S. chain of command. Initially an ad hoc body and predominantly staffed by personnel from the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization and RC East military officers, the ICMAG supported the EWG to align stakeholders and created national level, regional, and provincial plans in areas of U.S. priorities. The ICMAG grew to include U.S. ISAF and USAID planners with a breadth of influence and reach into their parent organizations. The EWG/ICMAG was a success because it created a credible and accepted forum for decisionmaking, aligned disparate strategies for the U.S. Government, and had a talented, well-networked staff able to gather information from all layers.

The EWG/ICMAG partnership is a model for civilian-military coordination and, if improved, can be carbon-copied at every layer of ISAF command, creating effective civilian-military coordination and making ISAF the hub (see figure 1). Such a structure would be more inclusive of multinational interests outside isolated embassy efforts and allow civilian-military planning to be more transparent. Establishing a Coalition Executive Working

Figure 1. ISAF Civilian-Military C² Model



Group (CEWG) and a Civilian Military Action Cell (CMAC) at ISAF headquarters and lower levels will deliver positive results.

The Regional Layer

Though there is no parallel Afghan regional governance structure, RCs enable military planning and have logistical assets to support fast-paced operations in the provinces. Regional designations suit Afghanistan's geographical, ethnic, and socioeconomic divisions; a regional focus allows resources to be applied better in a complex coalition theater.

Each region—North, East, South, West, and Capital—has a coalition two-star general leading the security mission. However, the success of the regional model to date begins to break down when confronted with the integrated planning needed for the next level of COIN operations. ISAF RCs have been historically ineffective at planning COIN operations because development strategies are handed down from Kabul or created at the PRT without input from the military RC headquarters. To overcome this situation, RCs require an ISAF civilian leader and a coordinating structure identical to the national level CEWG/CMAC model.

A CEWG already exists in RC South. The Partner's Coordination Board (PCB) has been effective in creating a regional understanding through voluntary participation of each province's senior civilian and mandatory attendance by task force commanders. However, the PCB has not been able to establish far-reaching authority because PRTs and their sponsor countries are reluctant to cede the influence of their capitals to a higher military coordinating body. In 2009, General de Kruif partnered with the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan to put a "civilian face" on the PCB but saw limited success; having an actual coalition-approved *civilian* regional commander would create needed unity of command over coalition PRTs. The PCB would be empowered by the contributing nations, endorsed as the lead regional coordination board, and become the driver of cross-provincial, civilian-military planning in the South.

RC South also benefits from having a well-established Civ-Mil Cell that strives to create the regional comprehensive vision needed to support planning for governance, development, and reconstruction, similar to the U.S. Embassy's ICMAG. The Civ-Mil Cell

has members from most southern partners (Australia, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States) and ought to be the direct support staff to the dual-command team and action secretariat to the PCB. Beyond planning, the Civ-Mil Cell is the lone interlocutor within ISAF that can seamlessly access donor and diplomatic networks. The cell identifies key problems, is an advocate for the region in Kabul, and can organize stakeholders to enable a southern strategy.

The CEWG/CMAC must still respect coalition requirements and interests: country-specific caveats will apply (RCs should not spend nationally driven dollars). However, we can no longer afford RCs imploring civilian development actors to provide information on project milestones, future planning initiatives, and donor strategies relevant to long-term military planning.

The Provincial Layer

Success at the provincial level is paramount because ministries, although lacking Afghan human capacity, do exist and can connect the population to the government. There are 34 provinces in Afghanistan; 26 have PRTs, and 13 of these are U.S.-led. Provincial development strategies are drafted and executed in relative isolation from ISAF (surprisingly, American military officers detailed to ISAF headquarters lack an understanding of U.S. PRT priorities because most information is close-hold or not transmitted over NATO computer systems). In many parts of the country, PRTs are supported by ISAF but not all their elements are under control because of a "lead nation" policy. The lead nation methodology is not working. As a result, in several provinces, strategies are often disjointed from ISAF; PRT proprietary attitudes over relationships with Afghan ministries reduce coalition effectiveness; and some PRTs have a cavalier attitude that their methods alone will win the war. Changes to the PRT C² structure would be—by far—the most difficult to implement; however, creating PRT unity of command up to ISAF, and unity of effort with the wider provincial team of actors (special operations forces, embedded and police mentor teams, and intelligence agencies), is critical.

Like the British in Helmand, Dutch in Uruzgan, and Canadians in Kandahar, all PRTs should be civilian-led and military-

enabled (the United States lags in this capacity compared to coalition PRTs and must recruit, train, and deploy enough civilians to support this structure). PRTs with civilian leadership are better at building Afghan capacity, delivering basic services, and improving rule of law because civilians are resourced in numbers and engaged in the military planning process. In fact, in the more successful PRTs, some senior civilians coapprove operations with the military commander. Making the PRTs civilian-led is not enough; PRT planning must be accountable in some way to ISAF. Presently, ISAF tries to obtain basic atmospheric through standard reporting and only receives 20 percent of required data because there is no incentive for PRTs to report. PRT-ISAF links are too informal, which weakens mission effectiveness.

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Provincial level elements (coordinated by PRTs) also require an EWG with key provincial stakeholders that can align plans and create true civilian-military effect. The British PRT, located in Lashkar Gah, has a Joint Coordination Board (JCB) chaired by a senior civilian, with British and U.S. senior military participation, and Danish senior civilian input. This team also works closely with the provincial governor to help shape operations. The summer 2009 clear-hold efforts in Babji, Khanishin, and Nawa were possible only through civilian-military planning with Governor Gulab Mangal, supported by the British and U.S. troop commanders.

There should also be a CMAC to carry out executive policy by aligning donor plans with security priorities to create synergy between the international provincial elements and provincial line ministries. A dedicated civilian-military staff working for the JCB, reporting to the ISAF chain of command, would ensure continuity across provinces and set achievable benchmarks measurable at the regional and national levels.

While the concept has been an essential tool for unity of effort, integrated command teams, which enable coordination between international civilian and military leadership in a province, often miss the mark and

become overly reliant on personality, consensus, and trust to get the job done.⁸ ISAF ought to endorse and train toward a structure in which civilians lead PRTs, the military supports civilian directors, and all reporting and assessments go through joint civilian-military RC teams up to ISAF headquarters and the broader CEWG in one coherent system. As U.S. troop deployments homogenize coalition battlespace, particularly in the South, the lead for all governance and development must remain nested in a single location—the PRT. As 2^d Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander Brigadier General Larry Nicholson said in a June 2009 PCB, “If you are not working with the [British] PRT, you are irrelevant to the governance and development mission.” Canada and the United States recently completed a Kandahar Action Plan, without ISAF input; again, ISAF was cut out of the planning process because of oversensitive bilateral concerns. Progress will continue to be nominal until development and military efforts are coordinated under one ISAF chain of command.

The District Layer

District level integration is less challenging than provincial because there are fewer cats to herd. However, the paucity of Afghans and the untenable security environment make

basic stability operations complex; it is all fog. Subprovincial efforts must adapt to unfamiliar Afghan tribal structures, the influence of the narcotics power brokers, and a void of Afghan district ministries. Counterinsurgency experts rightly argue that “district level governance, social justice, and security define the key terrain of the insurgency, and control at the local district level is vital.”⁹

In the interconnected and localized web of Afghanistan’s districts, a finely tuned plan that draws on the strengths of all our elements in the field is essential. As these areas move through shape-clear-hold-build, ISAF and its civilian partners must be able to move deliberately and seamlessly from military to civilian leads. In practice, the military leads on security regardless of the stage of the shape, clear, hold, and build framework. But to be successful, more civilian input is required. During Operation *Kaley*, the Canadian military’s “village approach” was dominated by uniformed planners, and when it came time to hold-build, there were not enough stability advisors to support operations. Battalion commanders should make all resources accessible to a civilian lead and allow governance/development to lead kinetic planning. Civilians in the field, conducting shuras or serving as political advisors, also need a small civilian-military staff to integrate planning across

district level stakeholders. Presently, there are one or two nonmilitary advisors supporting battalions and companies when there should be a 10-person CMAC linked into a larger ISAF civilian-military structure.

Resources for better district development are coming *online* through the U.S. civilian surge, but civilian-military C² is still very much *unaligned*, particularly in the southern coalition environment. The United States authorized the creation of a Senior Civilian Representative in RC East and RC South and the designation of “lead civilian” among the U.S. civilian agencies at each level. Presence was then extended to the district level through the creation of a District Support Team (DST) concept, which is similar to the British Military Stabilization Support Team. A DST will have two to three U.S. civilians with delegated authority to conduct

battalion commanders should make all resources accessible to a civilian lead

stabilization activities, such as implementing cash-for-work programs (providing an alternative to the insurgency), issuing vouchers to entice poppy farmers to grow wheat instead (facilitating a licit agro-based economy), and building governance capacity that leverages existing tribal structures (persuading Afghans away from the Taliban toward the Afghan government).

While the concept has been floated, DSTs have not yet been given the authority to align stakeholders at the district level. DSTs are American constructs that are not fully nested into coalition PRTs or ISAF. DSTs should have one civilian-lead actor, teamed with a military battalion commander and reporting through the civilian-led PRTs up to the ISAF region and then national headquarters. DSTs must be empowered to lead planning that is aligned with Afghan district level priorities.

Making Civilian-Military C² Real

Without a drastic C² shift toward full civilian-military integration, unity of effort is unlikely. The civilian-military C² structure outlined must be politically approved by NATO and installed in each of the four layers. In a perfect world, it can work. The greatest obstacle will be getting embassies to align civilian governance and development

Figure 2. Seamless Multinational Civilian-Military Integration

Civilian-military cooperation within a single nation is not enough in a mission with 42 participating countries. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ought to create structures that allow for seamless multinational civilian-military integration.

Dual-Command: All operations, at all levels, must be guided by a North Atlantic Treaty Organization–approved senior civilian, partnered with an ISAF military commander who is a co-equal with primacy over security operations. This two-person command team should speak with one voice down to subordinate commands and civilian development actors, across to Afghan ministries, United Nations partners, and the nongovernmental organization community, and up to national capitals.

Coalition Executive Working Group: The dual-command team must chair an approved Coalition Executive Working Group (CEWG) that includes all key stakeholders on that layer and below. This body can unify efforts along all lines of operation, aggregate planning and resource challenges, and communicate with the Afghan government in a unified manner.

Civilian-Military Action Cell: The CEWG must be supported by a Civilian-Military Action Cell staffed by first-rate personnel from each lead coalition partner at that layer. This cell, serving as a secretariat and plans/policy node, reports directly to the civilian-military command team.

Effective stability planning incorporates all key stakeholders at that layer and is civilian-led. This proposed ISAF structure does not eliminate other forums for integration; however, it does define a hierarchy of platforms that, if properly mandated, can fuse planning and execution efforts.

programming into a broader, coalition-coordinated strategy.

After this structure becomes reality (see figure 2), ISAF should fuse the civilian-military structure. Succinctly, each layer should have:

- a civilian and military co-lead
- an endorsed and inclusive multinational CEWG
- a robust CMAC with national representation of all key stakeholders on that level
- direct communication through dynamic staffing policies at all four layers.

Allowing CMAC personnel freedom to rotate up and down within the layers to work with national embassies strengthens unity of effort. Not until this author traveled to each southern PRT, up to Kabul and ISAF headquarters, and to other partner embassies did this maze of stakeholders become apparent. The ties between the U.S. Embassy ICMAG and RC South Civ-Mil Cell proved that interlayer coordination strengthens the link between national and regional priorities.

Coalition partners should retain civilian control (call it lead nation if necessary) over governance programs and infrastructure efforts, but there must be political agreement to link all projects into a wider national ISAF (and ultimately Afghan government) scheme of maneuver. Reporting must then funnel up to ISAF headquarters in Kabul to properly measure effects. Presently, much of the staff at coalition PRTs mock ISAF reporting and place national requirements first.

Cultural divides over how to conduct development do exist, but both Ambassadors and generals agree that COIN is a long and slow fight requiring strategic patience. Military officers recognize the importance of governance and development objectives but lack the development advisor's long view. Development experts realize that schools and wells without teachers and water management are not effective but seldom appreciate the enabling benefits of the military. Having the finest civilians and military officers collocated and working in unison under the ISAF umbrella to support Afghanistan's government is the best (and only) way forward.

After serving on General McChrystal's 60-day assessment team, Anthony Cordesman concluded the Afghanistan effort "should be an integrated civil-military effort and focus

on winning the war in the field, [but] is a dysfunctional, wasteful mess focused on Kabul and crippled by bureaucratic divisions."¹⁰ Others concur, claiming Afghanistan "development activities have not been integrated into counterinsurgency planning."¹¹ Embracing the recommendations of this article brings the international community and ISAF closer to unity of effort by creating unity of command, without undermining national sovereignty. The RC South PCB/Civ-Mil Cell is evidence that coalition civilian-military planning is possible, but nationalizing this model requires greater support from NATO partners at a political level. Moreover, ISAF, with a much greater civilian presence through its CMAC and other multinational civilian links to development agencies, must be the recognized forum for civilian-military planning and coordination. (Making this system work will require faster civilian training and deployment processes from coalition countries, putting qualified personnel throughout ISAF—a process that is under way.)

Having separate reporting and coordination mechanisms for national civilian and coalition military efforts is not working because the counterinsurgency can be won only by joint civilian-military efforts. A U.S. political advisor in Helmand Province recently stated, "Civilians like working *with* the military, but they do not like working *for* the military." If this sentiment is widely held, civilians should colead ISAF at all levels and be supported by experienced military commanders who understand counterinsurgency strategy.

Heeding this advice will not win the war in Afghanistan; victory can only be achieved through the sweat, blood, and tears of the Afghan people, who dream of a country free from tyranny. However, the recommendations herein can improve how the international community and coalition support the Afghan government. The present ISAF structure is ineffective because ISAF continues to take on governance and development planning without civilian governance and development expertise. Civilian leadership, partnered with a military commander, is required at all levels, and the CEWG/CMAC model will be the catalyst for fusion between national development strategies and military operations.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen has been cited on many occasions: "In Afghanistan, we do what we can. In Iraq, we do what we must." This is

old news. But the U.S. commitment to ISAF and Afghanistan is now redoubled, with hundreds of civilians with expertise in governance and development, billions of dollars for socioeconomic growth, and thousands of troops supported by robust combat enablers being sent. Integrating these resources into the ISAF structure under a single civilian-military command structure is the key to success. Counterinsurgency progress is symbiotic for civilians and the military; operations cannot be conducted in isolation. In or out of uniform, those serving in Afghanistan are part of *one* team. **JFQ**

NOTES

¹ John McCain and Joe Lieberman, "Our Must-Win War: The 'Minimalist' Path Is Wrong for Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 2009.

² General Stanley A. McChrystal, "July 2009 Tactical Directive," available at <www.nato.int/>.

³ Andrew Exum et al., *Triage: The Next Twelve Months in Afghanistan and Pakistan* (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, June 2009), 17.

⁴ The White House, "White Paper of the Inter-agency Policy Group's Report on U.S. Policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan," available at <www.whitehouse.gov/>.

⁵ *ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook*, April 2005, x, available at <<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/coin/repository/COH.pdf>>. Emphasis added.

⁶ The White House.

⁷ See John Howard Eisenhour and Edward Marks, "Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil-Military Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 22 (Summer 1999), 86–90.

⁸ The ISAF PRT Handbook suggests that an integrated command group, composed of senior military and civilian officials, should be collocated and have a highly consensual and considered approach to decisionmaking. The command group is responsible for taking ISAF top-level direction and, in combination with national priorities, determining PRT strategy to include approach, objectives, planned activities, and monitoring and evaluation systems. PRTs rarely respond to ISAF guidance.

⁹ Exum et al., 24.

¹⁰ Al Pessin, "More US Troops May Be Needed in Afghanistan," *Voice of America*, July 29, 2009, available at <<http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/07/cordesmanon-afghanistan/>>.

¹¹ Ashley J. Tellis, *Reconciling with the Taliban? Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009), 44.